A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE ON A TWO FRONT WAR

(The author dedicates this article to the Indian Navy and its brave personnel, who constantly guard our Maritime frontiers, in service of our Great Nation.)

“Army, Navy and Air Force are the military instruments of State Power. The history of warfare bears testimony that ultimate victory in war will be achieved through jointness among the three services”

                      -Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Former President of India

While the Indian Army was engaged in giving a befitting response to flexing of muscles by the PLA (Army) across the LAC, the aircraft and helicopters of the Indian Air Force were operationally deployed from the forward bases and maintained in a high state of alert. The assets of the Indian Navy, in terms of Long-Range Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft the P-8I and the MIG-29K fighter aircraft were also deployed in a synergized combat dimension with units of the Air Force and the Army for specific missions along the Northern border. In the Indian Ocean Region, which is our primary area of interest in the maritime domain, Indian Navy assets were deployed for exercises and specific missions. The Armed Forces of India, were therefore ready to counter any challenges or misadventures by China. 

It may be noted that the escalation matrix for two nations to come to blows and engage in war is a gradual and deliberate process. Several institutionalised mechanisms between potential belligerents and world bodies try and prevent its uncontrolled escalation. This graduated response calibrates the other nation's will and resolve to negotiate with strength or capitulate as so famously noted in the Melian Dialogue. The seeds of conflict are sown in localised disputes which results in skirmishes and raids, handled at the local commanders level, followed up with strikes on fortifications resulting in local engagements with limited use of ordnance and causing minimal casualties and collateral damages. The conflict is still localised between the respective posts on the borders or in the limited area where there is a dispute. Simultaneously diplomatic engagements, propaganda and informational campaigns are launched to help resolve the conflict expeditiously on terms that are honourable to both belligerents which is easier said than done. It is only when the escalation reaches the dimensions of a battle, the nation as a whole respond. This is when the diplomatic engagements are pursued vigorously. When diplomacy collapses wars happen. Even so, before a full spectrum, full blown war erupts another set of graduated responses begin with pitched battles followed up with limited conventional war and finally, God forbid, a nuclear war. If hard positions are taken, specially by the more potent power, the choice for the weaker power is fight or flight. In this decision, the armed forces of the nation are only one amongst the several organs of warfighting. A nation's industrial might, its population, social and political culture, economy and commitment to the cause are vital factors in the decision to go to war. And, to remind: -

National Power = (EcoPower+MilPower+InfoPower+Diplomatic Power) x WILL of the Nation. 

The Indian Navy uniquely has a stake in every aspect of national power. India 's quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean are twin factors that define her vast maritime interests. The responsibility of protecting these interests fall squarely on the shoulders of men in white uniform, as these have a vital relationship with the nation’s economic growth, prosperity, development and international status. The purpose of Navies is in the final analysis to maintain peace and stability and prevent war and if war should occur it must win decisively. 

However, the war at sea is uniquely different. Unlike the land frontiers, there are no visible geographical demarcation of “ours and theirs”. There is no distinct and easy segregation of “own and their forces” since the commons are global and presence of neutrals is a given. The medium of conflict ranges from the sub-surface, surface, air, electronic, cyber and space. The vagaries of weather play a significant role on both the man and his machine in warfighting. And, finally a targeting mistake can trigger a world war. To explain, a Torpedoed tanker carrying crude for the belligerent may be built in Japan, owned by Greek, flagged in Panama, chartered in the UK, manned by Philippian, Bangladeshi and Norwegians, insured in Belgium and carrying Saudi crude worth millions of dollars paid by traders in Dubai and Singapore.Therefore, when navies get engaged in war the reverberations of conflict impact not only the belligerents but many other players in terms of higher charter fees, higher insurance, longer routing of the mercantile trade - all of it impacting the economy of many nations.

Within war itself, a 'two-front war' is an escalation where a nation has to engage two nations acting in concert temporal and spatial separations. Akin to the Allies versus Axis combination that waged World War 2, multi front wars were simultaneously conducted across different geographies ranging from the European plains to African deserts to Asian forests and islands, and across land, air and sea. Hence, an armed conflict on two temporally and spatially separated fronts can be called a ‘two-front war’. These 'fronts' could involve armed conflict waged in separate domains (air war and land war, situation war-at-sea and war-on-land, etc.), or, the conflict could be waged in geographically distinct theatres (for instance, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal) or in different times trading force with space. Added into the definition is the possibility of a simultaneous conflict of one State against two others. 

The possibility of such a ‘two-front war’ as an outcome of the present tensions with both neighbors who also have a clear common interest to gain access to heights and control the BRI is areal and pressing reality. China and Pakistan acting either in collaboration or collusion with each other, in waging war against India is the subject of this analysis, from a maritime perspective.

In such a situation three clear possibilities arise. This would depend upon which nations escalate and engage in an armed conflict against India. China and Pakistan could possibly choose either a collaborative or a collusive approach depending upon who instigates the war. A collaborative ‘venture’ would be overt and all resources, including its personnel, of one nation could be available to the other in its prosecution of war. On the other hand, a collusive understanding would not make ‘personnel’ available but equipment and other support could be provided. These approaches could lead to the following scenario, among others:

1. India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China intervenes with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favorable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low.
2. India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral, technical and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China.
3. India and China are engaged in an armed conflict and Pakistan supports China by activating India's Western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such a support being extended by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is apparently high.

It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with China is quite likely to lead India into a two front war scenario, involving China and Pakistan.
Therefore, what is to be done?

As mentioned earlier, wars may be fought by the armed forces at a physical level whether jointly or individually depending upon the objectives of each campaign, but clearly it’s the entire national power of one belligerent pitched against that of the other which decides its outcome. As is widely recognized there are no Runners up in war as the consequences of its outcome changes the destiny of nations. Whether it was King Porus's loss to Alexander or the loss of Ibrahim Lodi to Babur or the battle of Arcot, India’s destiny changed forever as an outcome of those wars.Remembering these truisms, a modern ‘two-front war’must be planned as a national integrated, coordinated and harmonized effort of the entire capacity, capability and skill sets  of the state to overcome the enemy decisively and certainly not executed in fragmented segments of individual armed forces winning local skirmishes but losing larger battles and wars. On the contrary, all three Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards achieving the political aims through utilizing their combined military might by trading time, space and force to achieve and leverage its competitive advantage across various fronts. In the case of China, maximum asymmetries favourable to India are to be found in the Air domain and at Sea in the Indian Ocean Region. In so far as ground operations are concerned, both terrain and opposing force-levels generate symmetry rather than asymmetry. India must, therefore, maximize its comparative advantages in the maritime and air domains and resist the temptation of expending undue combat potential in other domains and geographical areas where China may have a relative advantage.

Such an approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre – not at the Corps level, but at the ‘Theatre’ level.  Basically, rather than confronting the adversary reactively at a chosen point-of-attack of his determination to stem or contain it, India should also proactively create other points of attack to force the adversary to divide his forces and react to Indian initiatives. Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a geographical area or a domain and at a time of India’s choosing, where combat potential of own Armed Forces is strong and that of the adversary is weak or vulnerable. It must also be factored that Cyber Warfare encompassing all domains will play a major role in any future conflict and as a nation, India should be prepared to counter the adversary effectively in the cyber domain as well. 

In the maritime domain, this would imply exploiting gaps in the adversary’s Force Levels, ability to operate in certain sea areas, and deployment time periods where Indian Naval Supremacy is difficult to contest. Taking the maritime war to the South China Sea or in areas where China can support its surface combatants by its shore-based aircraft protection envelope is not an option. China’s vulnerability is in the Indian Ocean where its merchant fleet transits over the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) carrying the goods, crude, commodities and resources that bolsters the Chinese economy. These oil arteries and trade routes have to transit within the Indian Navy’s area of dominance and through vital choke points in the Indian Ocean. So, in addition to the ‘Malacca Dilemma’, China also has a ‘Hormuz Nightmare’. This is the situation that must be exploited in waging war and opening a third front for the Chinese to contend with. 

One strategy would be to engage in trade warfare under the definition of contraband cargo. Arrest and detention of vessels carrying cargo destined for Chinese/Pakistan Ports by Indian warships or forcing them to take longer routes would begin to impact the economy of China, however marginally it may be in the short term, but definitely a longer term ‘loss of face’. 

This would, then, force the Chinese to dispatch their surface units to ‘visibly’ protect its merchantmen. Should the PLA Navy decide to escort their mercantile fleet in the Indian Ocean Region, requiring their escort forces to forage into areas where Chinese shore-based air power cannot be brought to bear and where the Chinese logistics lines would be severely extended opens up possibilities of better exchange ratios in India’s favour. Joint and combined operations with Indian Navy’s CBG and Air Force Maritime strike aircraft coupled with space-based tracking systems would advantageously deal with the Chinese surface combatants. So far as the sub-surface element is concerned - a combination of forces could deliver catastrophic consequences. Loss of its ability to have continued access to markets, commodities and resources necessary for its economy may encourage finding faster diplomatic solutions before other players take advantage of this situation and reacquire interest and assets in the South China sea with a little help from other powers. 

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are strategically located 1400 kms away from the Eastern Indian mainland and in proximity of Malacca strait. Suitable maritime reconnaissance, space and other assets, could be advantageously positioned, conforming to the operational imperatives in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, to use these as a launch pad for keeping the choke points, such as Malacca, Lombok, Sunda and Ombai wetar straits in the island chains and the critical areas of interest in the IOR, under maritime surveillance. These are relatively simplistic examples showing how India might introduce war winning asymmetries in maritime warfare across ocean areas so as to draw China into forays whose outcomes would be so unfavorable as to nullify any advantages that it might achieve on land. Similarly, other avenues favourable to India in the domain of the air should be explored by the Indian Air Force.

Overall, every effort should be made to firstly identify those comparative advantages in maritime and airborne power that would exploit maneuverer and logistics in the design of battle. Forcing China to deploy its navy and divides its air force along extended logistics lines could result in reduction of its ability to support the land campaign. The concept of operations would need to synergistically dovetail several operational enablers, where India has decisive strengths such as Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Network Centric Operations and Cyber Warfare, joint-ness and coordination, Flexibility and Manoeuvre at sea to gain a favourable maritime environment in India’s area of interest for ‘Sea Control’ of the SLOCs, by the aircraft carrier battle groups and ‘Sea Denial’ by its submarines. At the same time, any adventures initiated by the Pakistan Navy should be separately addressed and a highly aggressive campaign launched to ensure its influence in the ‘two-front war’ is limited to local naval defence of their ports and harbours only.

          The first step in conflict prevention is effective deterrence. Effective deterrence is a qualitative aspect measured in terms of deterrent value, which in India’s case, has been covered in detail in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS), ‘Ensuring Secure Seas’, 2015, “Strategy for Deterrence” (Indian Navy 2015, pp. 46-59). To paraphrase its core intent and communication it is a given that the “core of India’s deterrence, other than against nuclear coercion, will remain centered on conventional deterrence and conventional military forces” (Ibid, pp 50).  Deterrence has to be credible to be effective and it does not come about through ownership of assets alone but a clear communication of the will of the nation to use it. 

Therefore, to maintain a credible high deterrent posture, there is a need to maintain operational warfighting capabilities and assets in adequate quantity and quality. The Indian Navy is the principal instrument and manifestation of India’s maritime military power.  The IMSS 2015 ‘Strategy for Conflict’ (Ibid, pp 60-77) requires the Navy to continuously hone its professional skills in warfighting to maximize the Navy’s combat potential through operational enablers and innovative concept of operators and design of battle. The aim would be to attain the country’s political objectives of war and bring the conflict to an early and favourable conclusion by influencing decisions on land. To do so, maritime operations would focus on the adversary’s political, military, economic, cyber, informational and psychological paradigms. As a part of the battle readiness and planning process identifying missions to achieve short term, mid-term and long-term objectives of a ‘two-front war’ and allocating resources for its enablement is a vital requirement. 

The blue-print of the future Indian Navy envisages induction of a force level centered on three aircraft carriers, surface combatants, naval aviation assets and submarines both conventional and nuclear, along with cutting edge technology weapons and sensors, as part of a multidimensional integrated force. It is mandatory to have a ‘Blue Water’ Navy for the country in the prevalent environment, which certainly is not a provocation to war, but is the surest guarantor of peace in the Indian Ocean Region.

Adequate budgetary resources need to be allocated to ensure the timely development of the Navy as a credible and balanced force. Building such a force comes at some cost to the Government. The Navy’s force structure and force composition have been defined in the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP). The MCPP adopts a capability based and mission dominated approach for developing the Indian Navy as a balanced, multi-dimensional, networked force, with multi-mission, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities across the full spectrum of combat power. Hence, irrespective of the source of the threat a capability to mitigate it exists. 

However, to counter any thoughts of opening a ‘two-front war’ by the adversaries a credible deterrence posture and demonstrated combat potential of the Navy is a must. The Indian Navy has to be allotted its due share of the budget which has slipped to an abysmal low of about 12% of the total share from 17-18% some years ago. Also, no navy is built in a day or decade. Therefore, a comprehensive plan for the organized development of required capabilities to achieve specific mission requirements requires a long-term budgetary support expressly committed by the state. The Navy’s share of the defence budget should be restored to 18% at the earliest instance.

There is a clear need to continuously re-evaluate requirements, based upon technological advancements, geo-political developments, the areas of interest and influence and evolving operational philosophy. This must be an exercise that is undertaken at the strategic level where the nation as a whole integrates across the board its Diplomatic, Informational. Military, Economic and Space resources as the constituents of the national plan for addressing the contingencies of a two-front war. Downstream, the services must combine their capabilities to meet the operational directives that may be assigned to it. Following this would be single service missions and plans. The cost of preparation may well be high, but the price of failure is utterly unaffordable. The recently constituted Defence Planning Committee, while assessing the arithmetic of a two-front war could factor these considerations while evaluating the optional Indian response to a “worst case scenario” of a ‘two-front war’ with the possibility to open the “third front” at sea. 

As has been said “To be secure on Land, we must be Supreme at Sea”. 

Reference : Indian Navy, 2015. Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Indian Navy Publication.  

Admiral RK Dhowan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC (Retd) is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy, the Defence Services Staff College and the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. The Admiral has commanded three front line warships of the Western Fleet and has served as the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet and Chief of Staff of the Eastern Naval Command. Important staff assignments held by the Admiral at Naval Headquarters during his distinguished career include Deputy Director Naval Operations, Joint Director Naval Plans, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy and Plans) and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. The Admiral assumed charge as the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff in Aug 2011 and was subsequently promoted as the 22nd Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy on 17 April 2014. He retired from the Navy on 31 May 2016 after a distinguished career of 42 years in uniform. Post his retirement, he took over as the fifth Chairman of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, which is India’s premier maritime think tank. Lately, the Admiral is Chairperson, Society for Aerospace Maritime and Defence Studies. 

Email:  adm_rkdhowan@samdesindia.in